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Unprecedented Success: How the Alternative for Germany Party Capitalized on
Eastern German Economic Grievance and Euroscepticism in 2013 and 2014
Abstract
The Alternative for Germany party (AfD) has experienced a remarkably fast rise to state, federal, and
European electoral success and has disrupted German politics. This paper investigates how the AfD
achieved popularity in 2013 and 2014 and later became the first far-right German party since the Nazi
Party to be represented in the Bundestag. I find that eastern Germany’s aging population and deficient
economy engendered contempt for Angela Merkel and the Bundestag that transformed to euroscepticism
when Germany committed to taxpayer bailouts of Greece during the eurozone debt crisis while ignoring
domestic economic inequality. As such, the AfD’s single-issue platform of abolishing the euro resonated
with these older, economically marginalized eastern German citizens who felt neglected by the German
federal government and excluded from the benefits of the single currency. The findings of this paper,
combined with the projected continuation of the trends that enabled the AfD’s rise, suggest that the farright party will continue to erode the majority of the Union and will compel the Bundestag to reconsider its
domestic economic priorities.
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Unprecedented Success: How the Alternative for
Germany Party Capitalized on Eastern German
Economic Grievance and Euroscepticism in 2013 and
2014 - Aidan J. Schwob, Villanova University
Introduction
The right-wing Alternative for Germany party, referred to as the “AfD” after its German spelling,
Alternative für Deutschland, was Germany’s largest opposition party from 2013 until 2021, when Olaf Scholz
and the Social Democratic Party defeated retiring Chancellor Angela Merkel’s Union alliance in the federal
election, relegating the Union to opposition status (Goldenberg, 2021). In the 2021 election, the AfD lost 11
seats in the Bundestag, leaving the party with 10.87% of representation (Deutscher Bundestag, 2022). The AfD
initially rose to popularity in 2013 when it garnered 4.7% of the federal vote, missing the threshold for the
Bundestag by only 0.3%, and in 2014 when it entered the European Parliament backed by 7% of the German
vote (Grimm, 2015). When the AfD was voted into the Bundestag with 12.6% of the vote in the 2017 election,
it became the first party to the right of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) to gain federal representation
since the parliament of Western Germany was established in 1949 (Eddy and Erlanger, 2017). Much attention
has been directed to the causes of the AfD’s surprising success in breaking the German postwar taboo against
far-right populism. In this paper, I argue that the Alternative for Germany party gained popularity during 2013
and 2014 by capitalizing on the euroscepticism in eastern Germany that arose from the eastern region’s aging
population facing a struggling economy and experiencing economic grievance in the wake of the eurozone debt
crisis. This paper considers the rise of the AfD to have taken place between April 2013 and September 2014, the
18-month period during which the AfD evolved from being a nascent party to earning 4.7% of votes in the
federal election, 7% of German votes in the European Parliament election, and 10% of seats in three different
2014 German state elections (Deutsche Welle, 2014A; Deutsche Welle, 2014B; BBC, 2014).

Origins of the AfD
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The AfD originated in 2013 when Bernd Lucke catapulted the party into the German spotlight by
delivering a fervent speech to a crowd of 1,300 people in Berlin (Scholz, 2013). Lucke, a professor of
macroeconomics at Hamburg University, co-founded the party with Alexander Gauland, Konrad Adam, and
Gerd Robanus, all former members of Chancellor Angela Merkel’s CDU (Lachmann, 2013; Arzheimer, 2015).
When it was introduced in 2013, the AfD was a single-issue party advocating for the abolition of the euro and
the restoration of the deutschmark (Grimm, 2015). In response to Chancellor Merkel’s commitment to bailouts
of Greece, which reflected her unconditional support for the joint currency, the leaders of the AfD presented
their party as a rare political alternative in Germany (Lachmann, 2013).
The AfD’s resentment towards the eurozone was driven by the party’s belief that regulation of the single
currency had dissolved. Specifically, the AfD lamented violations of the Stability and Growth Pact, a eurozone
founding document that reinforces the convergence criteria outlined in the Maastricht Treaty (Arzheimer,
2015). Neither Germany nor France was held accountable for violating these requirements by running budget
deficits greater than 3% of their gross domestic products in the early 21st century. In addition to complaining
about the dissolution of fiscal regulation, the AfD argued that the Maastricht Treaty outlawed bailouts between
European Union member states. According to AfD leaders, the Maastricht Treaty’s “No Bail-Out Clause”
mandated that national governments were solely responsible for budget discipline and repaying public debt,
meaning that eurozone bailouts of indebted countries violated the regulations of European integration
(Arzheimer, 2015). Further, the AfD fervently contended that the European Central Bank’s fiscal and monetary
actions in response to the eurozone debt crisis, most notably the purchasing of Greek and Italian bonds, violated
the regulations of the single currency.
Only five months after its inception, the AfD narrowly missed the threshold to enter the Bundestag
(Berbuir, Lewandosky, and Siri, 2014). It went on to win seven seats in the European Parliament in the spring
2014 election. During the German state elections the following September, the AfD won 12.2% of the vote in
Brandenburg, 10.6% in Thuringia, and 9.7% in Saxony. All three of these federal states, along with the future
strongholds of the AfD as seen in Figure 1, are located in the eastern region of Germany, the former Soviet-
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controlled German Democratic Republic (Buck, 2017). The AfD’s rapid rise to popularity in the eastern region,
which is unprecedented in postwar German politics, can be attributed to an aging eastern population, a
struggling eastern economy, and economic grievance following the eurozone debt crisis at the turn of the 21st
century’s first decade.

Figure 1: 2017 AfD support map (Buck, 2017)

Factor I: Aging eastern German population
A primary cause for the AfD’s rise to popularity in eastern Germany is the eastern region’s aging
population. The federal states that comprise the former East Germany have a shockingly different age
distribution than the states in western Germany (Bauer, Rulff, and Tamminga, 2019). German district age
densities, shown in Figure 2, reveal that the eastern German regions have staggeringly few citizens aged 18-29.
While Berlin’s suburbs attract more people aged 30-49 to certain parts of eastern Germany, the region still lacks
a robust middle-aged population. Eastern Germany is home to a disproportionately large number of citizens
aged 50-64, with nearly every eastern German district containing a higher density of these older working-age
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people than nearly every district in western Germany. German citizens older than 65 are predominantly
concentrated in the rural portions of eastern Germany.

Figure 2: German age distribution by district
(Bauer, Rulff, and Tamminga, 2019)

The primary cause and consequence of the aging population in eastern Germany is internal migration to
western Germany, especially by young citizens (Klüsener and Goldstein, 2016). As seen in Figure 3, which
shows the migration balance of east-west migration in Germany between 1995 and 2006, eastern states
consistently lost citizens to western states (Glorius, 2010). This is also a self-reinforcing cycle. A region with an
aging population becomes less attractive to young citizens, further driving out more young people. Figure 4,
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cumulative migration totals between 2008 and 2014, shows the continuity of these migration trends. The many
dark red regions (highest net losses) in rural German areas indicate that young citizens cluster in urban areas,
often being attracted away from rural regions (Bauer, Rulff, and Tamminga, 2019). This is primarily because
education and subsequent labor market entry drives migration decisions for young populations (Schneider,
2005; Sunder, Trocka and Günther, 2008).

Figure 3: Internal migration balance of east-west migration in
Germany (Glorius, 2010)
Figure 4: Net migration as a
percentage of population, 19952010 (Bauer, Rulff, and
Tamminga, 2019)

Eastern Germany’s internal migration losses create a problematic shrinking of the workforce population
(Brautzsch et al., 2014). As shown in Figure 5, the east German labor force potential decreased 21% (2.3
million) between 1991 and 2013 (Brautzsch, 2014). Contrarily, the west German labor force increased by 6%
(2.5 million) over the same period. This loss in working population resulted in increased job vacancies,
especially for small enterprises seeking skilled workers. Of the 77 districts in eastern Germany, 41 are projected
to lose at least 30% of their working-age population by 2035 (Buck, 2019). In addition to slowing economic
growth, the aging population in eastern Germany is also more susceptible to populism and nativism. Pesthy,
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Mader, and Schoen identify that many older east German citizens were politically socialized during German
separation and therefore more inclined to far-right politics (Pesthy, Mader, and Schoen, 2020). Because of this,
a proportional increase in these conservative aging eastern Germans citizens resulted in a higher percentage of
votes for the far-right AfD. This is one explanation for why the shaded regions in Figure 1 are almost identical
to panels (c) and (d) of Figure 2.

Figure 5: Labor Force Potential (Brautzsch, 2014)

Factor II: Deficient eastern German economy
Another factor that explains the rise of the AfD in eastern Germany is the eastern region’s inferior
economy compared to the west’s (Deutsche Welle, 2019; The Economist, 2014). As seen in Figure 6,
productivity is far lower in the east, with gross domestic product (GDP) per capita of eastern Germany equaling
only 70% of the GDP per capita in western Germany (Buck, 2017; Blum, 2019). Per-capita GDP in eastern
Germany converged on western per-capita GDP in the years following reunification, but this convergence
stagnated as both regions experienced similar growth levels starting in 1995 (The Economist, 2014). As seen in
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Figures 6, 7, and 8, the federal states that make up the former German Democratic Republic (the five light bars
on the chart in Figure 6, the white districts in Figure 7, and the lightly shaded curve that starts in 1990 in Figure
8), have had the lowest per-capita GDPs in Germany from reunification through the 2010s, showing the
economic inequality between the two regions leading up to AfD’s rise to popularity (Buck, 2017; The World
Bank, 2013; Blum, 2019).

Figure 6: 2015 Per-Capita GDP of the Federal States of Germany (Buck, 2017)

The structural economic problems in eastern Germany, which have been compounded by the region’s
aging population, can be attributed to the privatization of former state-owned companies in the German
Democratic Republic. Upon reunification, the Treuhand privatization agency hastily sold former East German
state-held companies to the private sector to be integrated into the unified German market (Krueger and
Pischke, 1992). However, many of these companies collapsed because they could not compete within the new
German monetary union that set the values of the East and West German currencies equal even though the
West’s was four times as valuable (Beard, 2019). Because of the monetary union, the newly integrated eastern
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German region could not benefit from a weak exchange rate or low wages to improve its competitiveness, and
the products of eastern German firms became instantly overpriced. This cratered the eastern German economy
and triggered a rapid capital flight out of the east and massive job loss (Giebler and Wyrwich 2018).
Consequently, eastern Germany deindustrialized as employment in mining and manufacturing fell to 25% of its
pre-unification level (Carlin and Mayer, 1992).

Figure 7: Per-capita GDP by
German district, 2013 (The
World Bank, 2013)

Figure 8: Per-Capita GDP of east and west Germany over
time (Blum, 2019)

This “cold start” for the eastern German economy, with failed privatization leading to deindustrialization
and low investment, left deep scars in the region’s economy (Burda 2013; Deutsche Welle, 2015). In the 21st
century, the eastern regions of Germany still experience persistently higher unemployment and lower wages
than western Germany (Gramlich, 2019). As seen in Figure 9, eastern Germany had perpetually higher
unemployment and underemployment than western Germany between 1991 and 2013. While the gaps between
the two regions have shrunk for both measures, eastern Germany had totals around 4% higher for both
unemployment and underemployment at the time of the AfD’s founding in 2013. In addition to facing higher
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unemployment, the east German labor force also earns lower wages while working longer hours (Deutsche
Welle, 2018).

Figure 9: Unemployment and underemployment in eastern and western Germany
(Brautzsch, 2014)

Another lingering consequence of unsuccessful reunification is the dearth of company headquarters in
Germany’s eastern states (Blum, 2019). Figure 10 shows the imbalance in headquarter location for the top 500
companies in Germany (Bölinger, 2014). In 2013, when the AfD was established and began its rise to
popularity, eastern German states (excluding the German capital city of Berlin) were home to 14 of the 500, or
2.6%, of top companies. Between 2003, when it hosted nine of the top 500 firms, and 2013, eastern Germany
experienced a mere 1% increase in top company headquarters. Furthermore, as seen in Figure 11, not a single
company listed on the DAX Performance Index – the blue-chip stock market index comprised of the 30 top
German companies trading on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange – has its headquarters in eastern Germany
(Deutsche Welle, 2019).

53

Figure 10: Regional headquarter distribution of top 500 German companies
(Heimpold, 2014)

Not only does eastern Germany lack headquarters of top German companies, but firms located in the
east on average are smaller than in western states. This is another reverberation of the Treuhand’s swift
privatization. Because large firms in the German Democratic Republic could not be easily sold by the Treuhand,
many were partitioned into smaller firms that were more palatable to investors (Deutsche Welle, 2010A). The
results of this can be seen in Figure 12, showing 2012 state-level data of the average turnover per unit liable to
turnover tax (Heimpold, 2014). As Figure 12 shows, the average firm size in eastern German states is only half
of the average firm size in western German states. This small average firm size, combined with a lack of
company headquarters, resulted in low research and development investment and inferior productivity in eastern
Germany. These deficiencies, exacerbated by the economically problematic aging east German population,
significantly hindered the region’s innovation potential (Gregory and Patuelli, 2015). The combination of these
economic factors with the conservative nature of the aging population of eastern Germany fostered contempt for
the federal government and engendered the ideal atmosphere for the anti-euro AfD to carve its place in German
politics.
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Figure 11: Distribution of Listed Companies (Bölinger, 2014)

Factor III: Economic grievance after the eurozone debt crisis
Economic grievance after the eurozone debt crisis created the euroscepticism that the AfD needed to
attract eastern German support. As citizens of a region with an aging population and a deficient economy, east
Germans felt indignant towards Berlin and the Bundestag at the start of the 2010s. These trends began with
reunification in 1990 and continued throughout the 2000s, but when they were compounded by economic
grievance in the wake of the eurozone debt crisis, they produced the anti-euro sentiment on which the AfD
capitalized to rise to popularity. In March of 2010, Angela Merkel and the German Parliament approved a 22.4billion-euro bailout of Greece (Smale, 2015). Merkel justified the expensive taxpayer-funded foreign bailout
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package by claiming that Germany had no alternative but to support the euro (Deutsche Welle, 2010B). This
attitude was reflected in Parliament, as all parties in the Bundestag except the Left Party maintained support for
the euro and acknowledged the necessity of helping indebted eurozone countries (Kietz, 2013). In response to
this, eastern German citizens became frustrated that the federal government acknowledged the direness of the
European debt situation while neglecting domestic economic inequalities.

Figure 12: 2012 German firm size by state (Heimpold, 2014)

The AfD seized support from these disenchanted eastern Germans by directly countering Merkel’s
positions and criticizing her political actions. Lucke, the AfD leader, claimed that the eurozone debt crisis was
“the hour for political opposition” (Grimm, 2015). Further, he asserted that the AfD would “put an end to the
flagrant breach of democratic, legal and economic principles that we have seen in the past three years because
Chancellor Merkel’s government said there is no alternative... Now it is here, the Alternative for Germany”
(Eddy and Kulish, 2013). This message resonated with struggling eastern Germans, who, suffering from
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structural economic inequalities, did not support channeling resources to save the euro and instead believed that
the Bundestag should direct financial relief to eastern Germany.
By taking a stance against Merkel and the euro, the AfD was able to seize a small but still significant
portion of the German vote. Figure 13 shows the impact that a German voter’s opposition to international
financial bailouts had on his or her probability to vote for the AfD in the 2013 federal elections (Mader and
Schoen, 2016). The upward slopes of the curves demonstrate that increased opposition to Germany’s foreign
bailouts made a voter much more likely to vote for the AfD. The authors find that this relationship was not
present for other German parties. This finding demonstrates that economic discontent was the dominant cause
for AfD support in 2013. That opposition against taxpayer-funded bailouts was a vote driver for only the AfD
shows that economic grievance, which was experienced primarily by Germans in eastern regions with aging
populations and flawed economies, was the primary cause of the rise of the AfD in 2013 and 2014.

Figure 13: Impact of opposition to bailouts on probability to vote for the AfD, 2013
(Mader and Schoen, 2016)
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The upward slope on the curve in Figure 14, which charts the correlation between ethnocentrism and
opposition to bailouts, suggests that AfD voters who were opposed to the bailouts also had ethnocentric
attitudes (Mader and Schoen, 2016). This seems to imply that a cultural backlash argument can also explain the
rise of the AfD (Norris and Inglehart, 2016). Indeed, conservative AfD supporters likely harbored attitudes of
cultural backlash. However, the AfD at this time was a single-issue party advocating for the abolition of the
euro, meaning that economic grievance is the single best explanation of the party’s rise in 2013 and 2014.

Figure 14: Correlation of ethnocentrism and opposition to bailouts
(Mader and Schoen, 2016)

Conclusion
This paper has described the three primary causes behind the rise of the Alternative for Germany party
in the country’s eastern regions: eastern Germany’s aging population, its deficient economy, and the economic
grievance of its citizens after the eurozone debt crisis. The implications of these findings are significant because
the factors that allowed the AfD to gain representation at the state, federal, and European levels were not
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temporary. In fact, the contrary is true. Figure 15 shows that Germany’s population will continue to age, while
Figure 16 shows that the gap between the eastern and western German economies will continue to widen (FP
Analytics, 2019; Irrek, 2014). These projections, taken in tandem with this paper’s findings, indicate that the
AfD itself is not a temporary phenomenon. Instead, it will continue to influence German and European politics.
The findings of this paper are especially relevant to Germany’s political landscape as it emerges from the
COVID-19 pandemic and the corresponding worldwide financial crisis. Support for the AfD waned during the
pandemic as Angela Merkel and the Union combatted the virus, but a social and economic environment similar
to the one that originally fostered support for the AfD may arise in post-pandemic Germany (Schütz, 2020). As
the economic weaknesses of Germany’s eastern regions are further exposed, economic marginalization and
economic grievance will accelerate. If the ruling coalition does not acknowledge the worsening demographic
and labor force deficiencies of eastern German states and pledge financial resources to ameliorate the east’s
growing economic marginalization, the far-right party will continue to infiltrate the Bundestag and undermine
support for the coalition’s agenda.

59

Figure 15: German population age projections (FP Analytics, 2019)

Figure 16: Projection of eastern and western German GDP per capita (Irrek, 2014)
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